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Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge 
M. GIAQUINTO 
The main aim of this paper is to argue that a priori conceptual knowledge 
is possible even if unrevisable analytic knowledge is not. The consider- 
ations put forward by Quine (1 95 1, 1960) against the possibility of unre- 
visable knowledge resting on analysis of linguistic meanings and 
deduction from definitions do not weigh against the possibility of a priori 
discovery by the kind of conceptual thinking I will outline and illustrate 
in this paper. A secondary aim is to show that Quine's doubts about ana- 
lyticity still have considerable force and must therefore be reckoned with 
by any proponent of conceptual knowledge. 
I .  Quine untouched 
The thesis of the paper is that the influential Quinean considerations 
against analytic knowledge are consistent with conceptual knowledge of 
a certain kind. It is not argued that Quine is right about analyticity, but it 
is argued that the full version of Quine's view has not yet been shown to 
need restricting. Restricted Quineanism has had some big backers. 
Putnam has claimed that Quine was almost right, was more right than 
wrong, was importantly right and only trivially wrong, but wrong none- 
theless, as statements such as "all bachelors are unmarried" are indeed 
analytic (Putnam 1962; also 1976, 1979). Others have claimed analyticity 
for "all vixen are female foxes" and for definitions of kinship terms. Once 
we allow a few exceptions we might find it difficult to keep out mathemat- 
ics and logic. We might then be able to sneak in some metaphysics too if 
we call it modal logic; and then we would have much of what philoso- 
phers have wanted to count as analytic anyway. Perhaps Quine would be 
trivially right and importantly wrong if some whittled down version of his 
views were correct and not the full version. It will be no part of the strat- 
egy of this paper to sneak in something by assuming that the full version 
has only restricted application. On the contrary, I think that the unre- 
stricted Quinean view has considerable merit, and that Quine's original 
thinking withstands later attempts to show him wrong. I will now try to 
substantiate this. We will then be in a better position to see whether the 
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kind of conceptual discovery to be outlined really escapes Quine's scepti- 
cal net. 
The Quinean view is that any sentence we take to be true might come 
to be rationally rejected as false in the light of experience, and there 
would be nothing which w&ld make such an event a mere change of 
language and not a change of theory. The basis of this is a view about 
evidence, namely, that experience confronts the aggregate of our theories 
as a whole. To be a little more specific, the idea is that experienc~ con-
firms or undermines a hypothesis or theory only when other hypotheses 
are held fixed, i.e. assumed true. Experience alone does not dictate 
which hypotheses are to be held true; this is a pragmatic matter. Support 
for a claim, however well established, however much it seems like a defi- 
nition, may vanish if we jettison things we formerly held true; and this 
we may do for the purpose of explaining data with maximal overall sim- 
plicity. 
One example is the dictum that the shortest path between two points is 
a straight line. Observations led to acceptance of a theory according to 
which, for some pairs of points, more than one connecting path is minimal 
and these paths bend round massive objects. Something which seemed to 
be a definition of "straight line" was given up when General Relativity 
was accepted. It may be thought that this is just a change of language, that 
the term "shortest path7' is no longer being used with its original sense but 
now means "quickest photon route" or something similar. Certainly there 
was a change in the use of language, and on some views that constitutes a 
change of meaning. But there was also a change of theory, a change of 
belief. Beforehand physicists thought that there was exactly one path of 
minimal distance between any two fixed points, a path that does not bend. 
Now they disbelieve this. Something that was taken to be true by defini- 
tion turned out to be false. 
This is just one case, tied to the most theoretical reaches of physics. 
There are familiar examples of definition-like statements, such as "all 
bachelors are unmarried men", which would seem to be untouchable by 
the weird reversals of physical science. Our acceptance of these sentences 
and their trivial consequences seems to owe nothing to observation and 
everything to whatever it is that makes the relevant sound pattern (or 
inscription type) into an intelligible sentence of English. So there seems 
to be a substantial difference between these cases and scientific ones. 
Putnam has filled out this intuition with characteristic ingenuity (1962). 
We can illustrate in terms of the dictum about the straight line. "Length" 
(as in "path of minimal length") was a law cluster term-this is Putnam's 
expression. That is, it occurred in a cluster of statements of natural laws, 
each relating length to other things, thus providing a number of criteria for 
Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge 251 
the application of the term. With the advances of twentieth century phys- 
ics it was found that these criteria would sometimes give divergent results; 
so at least some of the criteria in at least some contexts of application had 
to be abandoned.' "Bachelor" by contrast is not a law cluster term. It has 
just one criterion of application, Putnam argues. Drop that and you simply 
change the meaning of the sound (inscription) "bachelor", as there is noth- 
ing else, no common thread, which makes it the case that the sound 
(inscription) is still being used for the kind of thing it was used for in the 
past. It might as well be soup. So such a change could not be a genuine 
change of theory; it would have to be a mere change of language. In other 
words, what is expressed by the sentence "All bachelors are unmarried" 
with its current meaning cannot be disbelieved. This is the essence of 
Putnam's case for saying that it is analytic. A similar argument can be put 
for a host of similar examples, like "Vixen are female foxes". 
But now suppose a bachelor agrees to marry a refugee, to save her from 
deportation to a country suffering civil war and disease. He has been told 
about her by people he trusts but has never met her; and after the marriage 
ceremony will never see her again. In such a case one might rationally 
come to hold that he remains a bachelor though married, on the grounds 
that the best overall theory for explaining social phenomena counts a man 
in this position as a bachelor along with other males who live alone. Of 
course there may still be a special legal use of "bachelor", just as there is 
a legal use of "guilty" according to which one is not guilty of a crime until 
one has been declared so as a result of a legal trial. But really the man in 
our story would remain a bachelor, just as a murderer whom the jury finds 
innocent would really be guilty. (Being married, according to the hypo- 
thetical theory, is also not a purely legal matter: our bachelor counts as 
married because he has undergone a ceremony socially regarded as a pub- 
lic declaration of intent to live together with the other central participant 
of the ceremony and nothing else has occurred to nullify the force of this.) 
We are supposing that discoveries in social science may bring about a sys- 
tematic re-evaluation of sentences including the sentence "all bachelors 
are unmarried". Would this be nothing more than a change of language? 
No, there has been a change of theory as well, our social theorist can 
reply: in our new theory marital status is regarded as much less signifi- 
cant; it turns out that marital status, unless set in a theory of byzantine 
complexity, is such a poor predictor of social behaviour that it is quite mis- 
leading to use it as a criterion of social classification. 
I According to Quine, the choices made as to what should be dropped were the 
offspring of pragmatic considerations: a change of theory for handling hitherto in- 
explicable data with least overall disruption and most overall simplicity. This is 
not disputed by Putnam. 
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What about the definition "Vixen are female foxes"? Suppose that we 
found some foxes with both male and female genital organs and zoolo- 
gists classified them as neither male nor female, but as hermaphrodite. 
Suppose it was also found that hermaphrodites rarely play both male and 
female roles. Zoologists may then classify a hermaphrodite who plays the 
female role biologically and socially, bearing and rearing cubs, as a vixen 
along with female foxes. Some vixen, then, would not be female but her- 
maphrodite. Before the discovery of hermaphrodite foxes, foxes bearing 
and rearing cubs were counted as vixen. Following the discovery it might 
be more disruptive to abandon this field criterion of vixenhood than to 
abandon the gender criterion, even though this had been held a definition. 
If so, it would not be irrational to reject the statement that vixen are female 
foxes. This would be a change of language use; but it would also be part 
of a rational theory change occasioned by novel observations. 
These possibilities suggest that it makes no difference that terms such 
as "bachelor" and "vixen" are not law-cluster terms and are one-criterion 
terms.' It seems to be enough that we can have theories involving the term 
in question. In such cases the criterion may change as part of a theory 
change due to attempts to accommodate new data (or new attempts to 
accommodate old data) with least disruption and most simplicity. In later 
papers Putnam has argued that there is at least one true statement which 
is a priori in the sense that accepting it is rational but subsequently reject- 
ing it would be irrational whatever our future experience (Putnam 1979). 
This one statement is that not every statement is both true and false. 
Putnam's idea is that rejecting this claim amounts to accepting and reject- 
ing anything and everything, and this one cannot do on pain of irrational- 
ity. But rejecting the claim might turn out to be saner than Putnam 
suggests. For in the course of our investigations into the nature of logic 
and language we might conclude a number of things about truth which 
taken together entail the rejection. For instance we might come to accept 
the familiar claims that truth is relative to a language or language fragment 
and that no language fragment can contain its own truth-predicate; we 
may in addition come to hold that truth is a matter of degree and that there 
are no maximal degrees of truth and falsehood (having the order-type of 
an open interval of reals, say). Coming to regard these propositions as 
having a high degree of truth in some relevant fragment of English, we 
may also take it that, for any given language fragment L, the sentence of 
the form "every L-statement is L-true to some degree and L-false to some 
degree" has a high degree of M-truth, where M is a semantic metalan- 
The acceptability of Putnam's claim that these are one-criterion terms de- 
pends on what constitutes a criterion. There are several tests (criteria) we may use 
for deciding whether someone is a bachelor, though there may be only one pred- 
icate which we treat as a defining condition (criterion) of bachelorhood. 
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guage for L. In this situation we should reject the saying that not every 
statement is both true and false, on the grounds that it fails to be properly 
specific, there being no reference to a language fragment; and even if con- 
text supplies the missing reference to a language fragment L, we might 
reject the claim as incompatible with the theory that any instance of the 
schema "every L-statement is L-true to some degree and L-false to some 
degree" has a high degree of truth in the relevant metalanguage. This 
would not amount to accepting and rejecting any and every statement 
whatever. 
One might change the example to make it harder to tell this kind of 
story; and I am far from sure that I could fill out the story given in a 
coherent way. But this would show only the limits of my ability to con- 
ceive certain possibilities. It is not part of the Quinean position that for 
any current belief, however firmly held, we are currently able to imagine 
a set of circumstances in which it would be rational to reject it. On the 
contrary, we may explain the common conviction that some sentence is 
unrevisable as due to a current inability to conceive of circumstances in 
which it would be rational to reject it. Quine's claim is merely that, for 
any dictum, such circumstances might obtain, not that we can currently 
conceive of them. Notice also that Quine's view is consistent with the 
possibility that there is a genuine psycholinguistic difference in the way 
we handle sentences we are inclined to regard as definitiom3 Holding 
certain sentences true as linguistic fixed points, as beyond test, may be a 
genuine sentential attitude, with practical benefits most of the time. The 
prevalence of such an attitude may help explain the persistent conviction 
that certain sentences are analytically true and beyond rational revision. 
But that conviction is not justified by the prevalence of the attitude. Our 
attitude to a sentence we currently hold true as a linguistic fixed point 
may change in the light of future empirical discoveries; such a change of 
mind need not be irrational. Hence Quine's view remains untouched by 
its most persuasive critics and can be elaborated to account for much of 
the resistance to it. 
2. Concepts 
Nonetheless my claim is that one of the main morals drawn from Quine's 
work- the moral that there is no a priori discovery-is wrong. The cen- 
tral idea is that we can acquire beliefs by means of reliable belief-forming 
dispositions due to our possessing certain concepts. What is a concept? A 
I got this point from Paul Honvich. 
254 IM.Giaquinto 
concept, as that term is used here, is a constituent of a thought, and a 
thought is a content of a possible mental state which may be correct or 
incorrect and which has inferential relations with other such contents. 
Thoughts are not defined as that which synonymous sentences have in 
common; and concepts are not defined to be meanings of words or 
phrases. Neither thoughts nor concepts are here taken to be linguistic enti- 
ties at all. This is not to deny that some thoughts can, in certain contexts, 
be expressed by uttering or writing a sentence. 
Why assume that thoughts have constituents? Without them there 
would not be inferential relations between thoughts. The thoughts that 
ants are smaller than mice and that mice are smaller than hogs together 
entail the thought that ants are smaller than hogs. This entailment depends 
on there being a common constituent, here signaled by the phrase "smaller 
than", in all three thoughts. Concepts are typically constituents of 
thoughts on which some of their inferential relations depend. Concepts on 
this view are abstract. So what is it for a thinker to possess a concept? Pea- 
cocke (1 992) manages to answer this question in a way which neatly ties 
together the various strands mentioned here, in his path-breaking work. 
He shows how a concept may be individuated by specifying the condition 
under which a thinker possesses the concept. To illustrate I give the pos- 
session condition for a concept plus for the positive finite cardinals. Fol- 
lowing developmental psychologists I call these cardinals "numerosities"; 
and I use the term "collections" for finite non-empty sets. 
The concept PLUS,,,,,,,,is that concept C which one possesses if and 
only if one finds inferences of the following types primitively 
compelling: 
s,t are disjoint collections and num(s)=n and num(t)=m 
num(r) = nCm 
for some disjoint s and t ,  sut=r and num(s)=n and num(t)=m. 
Two points of clarification. The first is about notation. The letter "C" here 
is just a variable, like the "x" in: 42 is that positive number x such that x 
multiplied by itself equals 2. It is a variable which ranges over concepts 
of a specific category, which we may loosely think of as concepts of 
binary functions. "num(s)" abbreviates "the numerosity of s" and "sut" 
abbreviates "the collection of everything in s and everything in t". Sec- 
ondly, one finds an inference primitively compelling just when one finds 
it compelling-if one were to judge the premiss (or premisses) true one 
would be at least as sure of the conclusion-and one's finding it compel- 
ling is not in turn based on some reason. What is the point of this qualifi- 
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cation? You will find many inferences involving PLUS,,,, compelling. For 
example: 
num(s) = a+b. 
num(s) = .\i(a2+b2+2a6). 
(Here "+" abbreviates "PLUS,,,,".) It is obviously too strong a require- 
ment for possessing this concept that one must find all of these infer- 
ences compelling. So we must ask: which inferences, out of the ones we 
find compelling, are the ones we must find compelling in order to pos- 
sess the concept? We clearly need to exclude those types of inferences 
involving the concept which have become compelling as a result of 
some reasoning. For that would entail that those inferences were under- 
stood (and so the concept was possessed) prior to our finding those 
inferences compelling. We find the type of inference in the example just 
given compelling because we have inferred its validity from a prior 
belief, namely 
( ~ + b ) ~= (a2+b2+2ab). 
We must already have had the concept PLUS,,, in order to have this belief. 
So, finding that inference compelling cannot be required for having the 
concept. 
It should not be assumed that there is a unique concept expressed by the 
word "plus", or that for any two concepts so expressed one is a restriction 
of the other. A concept of addition for finite continuous magnitudes will 
not be so related to a concept of addition for cardinals including the trans- 
finite. Even when we restrict attention to the discrete and the finite, there 
is diversity. Besides the concept given above there is a concept for addi- 
tion of positive finite ordinals. For example, the concept PLUS,,,,,, is that 
concept C to possess which one must find inferences of the following 
types primitively compelling: 
x is the nth item after the mth item in a sequence 
x is the (mCn)th item in that sequence 
and the reverse. This diversity is consistent with the fact that there is a 
more abstract concept of addition applicable to both finite ordinals and 
finite cardinals (including their zeros). Thus we make room for the possi- 
bility that one acquires a more comprehensive abstract concept only after 
operating with one or both of the less abstract concept^.^ 
Concepts of other arithmetical operations on numerosities can be spec- 
ified in the same way, that is, in terms of the types of inference that one 
must find primitively compelling if one has the concept. For each of these 
? For more on diversity and its importance see Giaquinto (1995). 
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concepts there are two types of inference, one for introducing the concept, 
the second for eliminating it. Here they are for three basic operations. 
MINUS,,,,,,, 
-i t is a subcollection of s and num(t)=m and num(s)=n 
num(s-t) = n-ni. 
-e num(r)=n-m. 
for t disjoint with rand  num(t)=m, num(rut) = n. 
TIMES,,,,,,,, 
xi s is the union of n disjoint collections of numerosity m 
num(s) = nxnz. 
xe num(s) = nxm 
s is the union of n disjoint collections of numerosity m. 
DIVIDED-B Y,,,,,,l 
li num(s)=n and s is the union of m disjoint collections of equal 
numerosity z 
nlm = z. 
le  nlm = z 
if num(s) = n, s is the union of m disjoint collections of 
numerosity z. 
3. A conceptual route to knowledge 
Possessing these concepts involves having a number of inferential dispo- 
sitions. For example, if, having the concept PLUS,,,,,, you were to judge5 
of some collection r that its numerosity is n+m, you would find it compel- 
ling that r is the union of disjoint collections of numerosities rz and nz, 
without further reasons. Schematically, you are disposed to believe $(r) 
upon judging F(r), without further reasons. If you are aware of this, do not 
distrust it, and possess a concept for restricted universal quantification, 
you will believe the co~esponding generalisation: Every F satisfies @.6  In 
this case the corresponding generalisation is: Every collection of numer- 
Believing is a state; judging is an occurrence. Specifically, one judges a 
thought true when in thinking the thought occurrently one accepts it or mentally 
endorses it. 
Here I am supposing that possessing a concept for restricted universal quan- 
tification includes finding inferences of the following type primitively compel- 
ling: 
F(c) entails $(c), for any designator c; so VF(x)[$(x)]. 
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osity n+m is the union of disjoint collections of numerosities n and m. So 
here is one example of a belief one may acquire simply as a result of hav- 
ing certain inferential dispositions essential for having constituent con- 
cepts of the belief, together with a minimal self-awareness. This belief is 
the generalisation arising from +e, the elimination inference for PLUS,,,,,,,. 
In the same way we can acquire belief in generalisations arising from the 
inferences which characterise other concepts. One to be used shortly is the 
generalisation arising from xe: Any collection of numerosity nxm is the 
union of n disjoint collections of numerosity m. 
Now suppose that in addition to these concepts one has familiar logical 
concepts7 and a concept of numerical equality that makes compelling the 
substitution of equals for equals. Then one can arrive at non-trivial beliefs 
by means of the inferential dispositions that are essential to having these 
concepts. An example is belief in the basic relation between TIMES,,,,,,,and 
DIVIDED-B Y,,,,,,,: 
(#) h =jxk if and only if hlj = k. 
Here are moves in thought, with some ell is ion^,^ leading to belief in the 
left-to-right half of this biconditional. The listing is not meant to indicate 
temporal sequence; obviously an inferred thought occurs after activation 
of the relevant inferential disposition, but we should not rule out the pos- 
sibility of inferences occurring in parallel. 
Let 
(A) h =jxk. 
Then by logical inference from (A) 
(B) Any collection of numerosity h is a collection of numerosity jxk. 
The generalisation arising from xe is 
(C) Any collection of numerosity jxk is the union o f j  disjoint collec- 
tions of numerosity k. 
Then by logical inference from (B) and (C) 
(D) 	 Any collection of numerosity h is the union o f j  disjoint collec- 
tions of numerosity k. 
Then by li from (D) 
( E )  hlj = k. 
Then discharging the assumption (A) gives the conditional 
Suppose in particular one has a concept of conditionals which makes com- 
pelling the move of discharging an assumption P used to reach Q by weakening 
the conclusion to P -+ Q; a concept of restricted universal quantification that 
makes compelling VFx[Fx],and the move from VFx[Gx]and VGx[Hr]to 
VFx[Hx];a concept of equivalence that makes compelling the move from P -+ Q 
a n d Q + P t o P t , Q .  
The logical moves are glossed over but can easily be supplied. 
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(F) if h =jxk, hlj = k. 
There is a corresponding route to the converse conditional. 
Some clarification is needed here. What I have presented looks suspi- 
ciously like a justification of a belief one already has. Can it also be an 
account of a process leading' to belief?Yes, if we add in some background. 
A number of transitions in thought are listed. Something must get them 
going, some mode of activation, mental exploration, focussed on connec- 
tions between the arithmetic operations (under the given concepts). This 
directed exploration need not occupy conscious attention and need not be 
under voluntary control. This mode provides the motivating power to get 
occurrent thoughts from belief states, e.g. the judgement (C), and the 
motivating power to make inferential dispositions available (or ready) for 
activation by the occurrence of a thought, e.g. the readiness of li for acti- 
vation by (D). 
Is this way of getting the belief # (i.e. that h =j xk  if and only if hlj = k) 
epistemically acceptable? This breaks down into two questions: Is this 
way of acquiring the belief reliable? Does it involve any violation of epis- 
temic rationality? If the belief is acquired in the manner described it is the 
result of nothing but the activation of a number of inferential dispositions, 
dispositions resulting from possessing concepts which are constituents of 
the thought believed.' Thus the question of reliability boils down to this: 
Are those dispositions reliable? Such a disposition is reliable if, whenever 
activated, the inferred thought would be true were the thoughts it was 
inferred from true. A routine check on the inferential dispositions 
involved shows that they are reliable. To check li, for instance, we just 
need to see whether, if a thought of the form "num(s)=n and s is the union 
of m disjoint collections of equal numerosity z" were true, the correspond- 
ing thought of the form "nlm = z" would also be true.1° 
Acquiring a belief by activation of reliable inferential dispositions and 
conditional weakening cannot in itself be irrational, given that the aim of 
belief is truth. That is because an inferential disposition is reliable only if 
its activation does not involve inferring an untruth from a truth; so a 
belief arrived at by conditional weakening on the result of an inference 
will be true, given reliability. Nonetheless, there are conditions under 
which acquiring a belief by means of reliable inferential dispositions, or 
Perhaps conditional weakening (discharging an assumption P used in getting 
conclusion Q and weakening the conclusion to P --+ Q) is not, strictly speaking, 
an inferential move. If so, the corresponding disposition is also not inferential. 
But for simplicity of exposition we can assimilate it to the move from "P entails 
Q" to "P,Q". 
l o  It might be argued that a stronger kind of reliability is needed here. The dis- 
positions involved in this example survive the other plausible accounts of reliabil- 
ity that I know of. 
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maintaining a belief so acquired, violates rationality. Let a be a belief 
acquired by means of reliable dispositions. Suppose one is aware of hav- 
ing beliefs inconsistent with a and of lacking grounds for greater confi- 
dence in a than in the beliefs inconsistent with it. In this circumstance 
rationality demands that one does not believe a (or at least not with full 
confidence). Another such condition would be having a rational con- 
scious (but false) belief that the way in which a was acquired (and sus- 
tained) is unreliable. There are probably other defeaters, cohditions 
under which it would be irrational to come to believe a certain proposi- 
tion or to continue to do so, though that belief was acquired by reliable 
means. 
But there is no good reason to think that avoiding defeaters is impossi- 
ble or even difficult. The contrary thought probably results from a mis- 
taken view of rationality requirements. An example is the common view 
that consistency of one's belief set is required for rationality. (This is too 
harsh because it overlooks the possibility of arriving at a number ofjointly 
inconsistent beliefs, each with justification, when the inconsistency is 
extremely difficult to detect. In this case the believer would be unlucky but 
not necessarily irrational.) So it is possible, perhaps easy, to get a belief 
by activation of a reliable belief-forming disposition and keep it, in the 
absence of defeaters. Thus no irrationality need occur in getting belief # 
in the manner indicated and retaining it. 
As this way of getting the belief is reliable and need not involve any 
violation of epistemic rationality, it is epistemically acceptable. As the 
belief is true, the resulting belief state counts as knowledge on some cur- 
rent views of propositional knowledge. Even if you think that proposi- 
tional knowing requires that some further condition be fulfilled, we might 
agree that true beliefs which are reliably and rationally acquired and 
retained have a valuable epistemic status akin to knowledge. Belief states 
having this epistemic status-I will assume that it is knowledge for ease 
of exposition--can be conceptual, in that they result from the activation 
of inferential dispositions essential to possessing concepts which are con- 
stituents of the thought, without the use of experience as evidence. That is 
what is illustrated by the way of getting belief # sketched earlier. This is 
just one example. Elsewhere I have illustrated the same point by present- 
ing a conceptual route to the belief that the triangles either side of a diag- 
onal of a Euclidean square are the same in size, and I see no reason why 
belief in non-mathematical truths cannot be acquired in the same way, 
reliably and without defeaters. Hence the possibility of conceptual knowl- 
edge. 
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4. A priori yet revisable 
This way of coming to know # is conceptual, in that it depends causally 
on the activation of inferential dispositions essential to possessing con- 
cepts which are constituents of the thought; and it is a priori in that no 
experience is used as evidence in the process of getting the belief. In this 
sense there is conceptual a priori knowledge. 
Claims of this sort are liable to provoke a hostile response. "There is 
no such thing as analytic knowledge, knowledge by grasping the mean- 
ings of expressions, concepts or whatever. This is the advance that Quine 
represents over Carnap." The argument behind the hostile response is 
this. Any sentence we take to be true might come to be rationally 
rejected as false in the light of experience,.and there would be nothing 
which would make such an event a change of language and not a change 
of theory. This applies to the sentence I used to express #. It might get 
swept into the bin of falsehood in a systematic revision of our assign- 
ment of truth values to sentences in making best sense of experience. 
Thus the rationality of our currently assigning it truth does depend on 
that assigment's compatibility with a total assignment which fits well 
with experience. In short, rational acceptance of it depends on experi- 
ence. So, the objection runs, our coming to believe # in the a priori man- 
ner described earlier cannot result in knowledge or anything 
epistemically akin to knowledge. 
This involves an equivocation about dependence. One can say that 
rational acceptance of something depends on experience, having in mind 
that it is rationally revisable in the light of experience. But one could also 
mean that rational acquisition of the belief must be based on experience, 
that there must have been some experience which was used as evidence in 
reaching the belief. The former means that the rationality of holding on to 
the belief depends on the absence of countervailing experience; the latter 
means that the rationality ofgetting the belief depends on the presence of 
supporting experience.[ We could mark the distinction by saying that if 
a belief is rationally revisable in the light of future experience, its reten- 
tion is negatively dependent on experience; and if a belief cannot have 
been rationally acquired unless some experience was used as grounds in 
the process, its acquisition is positively dependent on experience. The 
final inference of the objection is, in effect, an inference from the negative 
experience-dependence of retention to the positive experience-depen- 
dence of acquisition. Why should we accept this inference? Why assume 
I do not suppose that what counts as countervailing and supporting experi- 
ence for a claim is determined by that claim alone. On a Bayesian response to Du- 
hem's lesson, the degrees of confidence we have in other claims will be a factor. 
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that a belief which is vulnerable to experience cannot have been rationally 
acquired in an a priori manner? There is nothing in Quine's arguments 
which justifies this assumption. Moreover, Quine allows for the possibil- 
ity of genuine a priori acquisition when he says: 
Now the very distinction between a priori and empirical begins to 
waver and dissolve, at least as a distinction between sentences. (It 
could of course still hold as a distinction between factors in one's 
adoption of a sentence, but both factors might be operative .every- 
where.) (Quine 1960, § VI) 
The sentence in parentheses suggests that there might be distinctively a 
priori factors in acquisition; by claiming only that they might always be 
accompanied by empirical factors he allows for the possibility that in 
some cases they might not. 
Suppose that you followed a long proof that A deductively entails B, 
where A and B are mathematically complicated propositions, and that you 
came to believe A -+ B as a result, and that there are no defeaters, no rea- 
sons you are aware of for doubting the result or the legitimacy of the way 
you arrived at the conclusion. The belief will have been rationally 
acquired. Sometime later you and the experts you trust find yourselves able 
to explain some new phenomena only on the assumption that A holds in 
the physical world but not B. If the phenomena explained by your explan- 
atory model are sufficiently impressive, it might well be rational to revise 
your attitude to the claim that A --+ B, and to believe that the attempted 
proof had some unnoticed slip or used some established logical rule which 
in fact has exceptions. That is, experience might lead to rational rejection 
ofA --+ B even if it is true and the argument you followed really was a proof 
and there were no ulterior circumstances undermining the rationality of 
your coming to believe it that way. That would be a case in which retaining 
the belief depended negatively on experience though acquiring it did not 
depend positively on experience. The view put forward here is that con- 
ceptual acquisition of a belief is not positively dependent on experience, 
i.e. the belief can be rationally acquired without the use of experience as 
evidence for it. This is consistent with the possibility that its retention is 
negatively dependent on experience, i.e. rationally deniable in the light of 
experience-and that is what the Quinean considerations argue for. 
Quine noted the contrast between acquisition and retention; I would like 
to stress the contrast between positive and negative dependence on expe- 
rience. If a belief can be rationally acquired without the use of experience 
as evidence for it, as is claimed here, it can also be rationally retained with- 
out the use of experience as evidence for it, as long as the believer has no 
reason to question it. In such cases neither acquisition nor retention is pos- 
itively dependent on experience. Thus there may be rational a priori reten- 
tion as well as rational a priori acquisition of a true belief. If, in addition, 
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the belief was reliably acquired it would be a priori knowledge, on some 
accounts of knowledge. All this is consistent with the claim that retaining 
the belief is negatively dependent on experience: something known a priori 
may be rationally revisable in the light of possible future.experience.I2 
5. Conceptual but not analytic 
You may still believe that thoughts and concepts, if there were such 
things, would be sentence meanings and word meanings respectively, 
even though thoughts and concepts were not introduced that way in this 
paper. You may also think that the process of belief acquisition described 
earlier is nothing more than deduction from definitions or statements of 
meaning. So conceptual knowledge would just be analytic knowledge in 
other terms, and this does clash with the central Quinean theme. 
On the view presented here, thinking a thought is a mental occurrence, 
and believing a thought and possessing a concept are mental states, each 
with a neural basis (perhaps different in different thinkers). Thoughts and 
concepts, then, are theoretical entities in psychological explanation. If 
there were a sound argument for the claim that entities playing the role 
here ascribed to thoughts and concepts would have to be linguistic mean- 
ings, that might be good news for linguistic meanings, rather than bad 
news for thoughts and concepts. It would depend ultimately on whether 
cognitive science needs to posit such entities. However, it is idle to spec- 
ulate on the matter until we have a sound argument for identifying 
thoughts and concepts with sentence and phrase meanings. To the best of 
my knowledge no such argument has been presented. 
But there is a challenge here. How else is thought related to talk, given 
that there really are thoughts, if thoughts are not sentence meanings? 
There is growing evidence that thinking a thought is not inner talk, espe- 
cially in connection with numerical reasoning.13 In the other direction, lit- 
l 2  Peacocke (1993) also draws conclusions about the a priori from his theory 
of concepts, but his differ from mine. Peacocke's "a priori" is a property of 
thoughts (not of ways of acquiring beliefs). He argues that some truths are "know- 
able in advance of any empirical information about the way the world is" because 
they are a priori (in his non-epistemic sense). My concern is to show that some 
truths are knowable a priori in an epistemic sense and that this is compatible with 
Quine's revisability thesis. Peacocke does not claim this. 
l 3  There is substantial evidence of numerical reasoning in non-human animals 
(Church and Meck 1984; Capaldi and Miller 1988; Boysen and Bemtson 1989), 
human infants (Wynn 1992), and patients with severe, even total aphasia (Rossor 
et al. 1995). There is also evidence of physical thinking in human infants (Leslie 
1988; Spelke 1988). 
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era1 talk is not always thought made loud. Suppose one wants to 
communicate the result of adding certain weights, and does this by saying 
"38 pounds plus 27 pounds is 65 pounds in total". The speaker could have 
used the word "plus" here to express one of many concepts of addition, a 
concept appropriate for cont'inuous magnitudes, or a concept for discrete 
magnitudes; and, if for the latter, a concept for integer values only, or for 
fractions as well; a concept which makes primitively compelling an infer- 
ence to the result of correctly determining the magnitude of an aggregate, 
or a concept too abstract for this; and so on. More likely, however, is that 
the speaker has no idea precisely which concept of addition was involved 
in the thought that prompted her assertion, would have no answer if asked 
which concept she intended to express by her use of the word "plus" and 
does not care anyway. In this case the speaker would not be using the word 
"plus" to express a concept at all. As no single concept of addition is 
expressed by the word, no single thought is expressed by the sentence. Yet 
this could be a case of successful non-metaphorical communication. So 
information can be linguistically communicated (or recorded) without the 
expression of an individual thought. This is not to deny that sentences can 
be used to express thoughts, and subsentential phrases can be used to 
express concepts. But the precision of intention necessary for this might 
be rare. Thus the relations between thought and talk are unlikely to be 
simple, direct, and context-free.I4 
What of the charge that the process of belief acquisition described ear- 
lier is nothing more than deduction from definitions of "+" and "x"? On 
my account, the process of reaching belief # does indeed resemble a 
deduction, and this is no accident. Perhaps it is a deduction, if that term is 
used psychologically, for a flow of truth-preserving transitions between 
occurrent thoughts. But the process of acquisition itself-in contrast to 
the process of following my description of i t -does not involve the exer- 
cise of any linguistic ability; in particular it does not involve using knowl- 
edge of word meanings or of relations of synonymy between linguistic 
expressions. The symbols "+" and "x" are used in my account of the pro- 
cess to stand for concepts. The process of belief acquisition does require 
possession of those concepts; but it does not require knowing that the 
symbols express those concepts. So there is no question here of discover- 
ing an arithmetical truth by analysis of linguistic meanings. The discovery 
is conceptual, but not analytic. 
l 4  Moreover, the constituents of thoughts+oncepts-are unlikely to be iden- 
tical with word meanings, assuming that our lexicons individuate meanings fairly 
well, since concepts are just too fine-grained: there will often be many concepts 
conforming to a single lexical entry. 
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6. Thought, talk and theory-change 
No statement is immune to revision, Quine says. The simplest and least 
disruptive way of reconciling our beliefs with surprising new findings 
might require drastic re-assignments of truth values to sentences, includ- 
ing the rejection of those we previously regarded as definitions. When 
there is a drastic theory change, requiring systematic re-evaluations across 
the board, some beliefs will go and others will remain. If beliefs .are atti- 
tudes to thoughts which need not be tied to sentences, as is suggested by 
the mounting evidence against the hypothesis that thought is inner talk, a 
belief can remain even when the sentence previously most used to express 
it has been rejected as false. In other words, a re-assignment of truth val- 
ues to sentences can indicate some belief change, without a revision of 
attitude to all the beliefs that were expressed by the re-evaluated sen- 
tences. Consider the sentence 
(EU) 	 Between any two points there is exactly one path of minimal 
length. 
In the context of pure mathematics before the discovery of non-Euclidean 
spaces, sentence (EU) was held true. Since the discovery of non-Eucli- 
dean spaces, we would say that in some spaces, including Euclidean 
spaces, (EU) is true; in others not. But we would not grant that (EU) is true 
outright. Of course, if it was uttered in a context which made it clear that 
Euclidean spaces were under consideration, we would say that the utter- 
ance was correct or that a true thought was expressed. But that true 
thought is a mathematical thought which (EU) was used to express with- 
out (implicit or explicit) qualification, prior to the discovery of non-Eucli- 
dean geometry.' Thus one of the beliefs expressed by a rejected dictum 
remained. Still, this was not a mere change of language. The change in 
evaluation of (EU) was part of a larger systematic re-assignment of truth- 
values to sentences. This larger upheaval involved a significant change of 
theory. For instance, it came to be believed that physical space might not 
conform to Euclid's axioms, that such a failure is a mathematical possibil- 
ity. This and other such changes of belief (actually not occasioned by an 
empirical discovery) required a systematic alteration of geometrical talk, 
including the change in the use of sentence (EU). 
An a priori process involving some of the geometrical concepts that gave 
rise to Euclidean geometry can result in a belief that (EU) was once used 
l 5  That sentence may also have been used to express a number of false 
thoughts, e.g. that between any two points in physical space there is exactly one 
path of minimal length, or that between any two points there is necessarily exactly 
one path of minimal length. Also, it could have been used without sufficient dis- 
crimination for expressing any single thought. 
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to express, whether or not the believer is aware of non-Euclidean geome- 
tries. The same thought with the same constituents-Euclidean geometri-
cal concepts among them-can have been believed by ancient and recent 
mathematicians alike; moreover they can have acquired the belief in the 
same way. But they could not express it in the same way, since our con- 
temporaries must indicate their intention to exclude non-Euclidean spaces. 
For this reason it is misleading to regard the dethronement of Euclidean 
geometry as the discovery that it is false. The Euclidean thoughts are true, 
but their constituent concepts have restricted application-a fact which led 
us to qualify our expression of those thoughts. Euclidean geometry is not 
an isolated case. For a numerical example consider the sentence 
(R) Negative numbers have no square root. 
Before the discovery of the complex numbers this sentence was held true. 
Since that time we would say that (R) is true in the real number system but 
false in the complex number system. We would no longer accept that (R) 
is true without qualification. Of course, in a context in which it is clear that 
only the real numbers are under consideration, (R) can still be used to 
express a true thought. That true thought was already believed before the 
complex numbers were introduced and was no doubt expressed by utter- 
ance of R. The change of language that was necessitated by discovery of 
the complex numbers was accompanied by a change of belief: it had been 
believed that there was no system of numbers in which a negative number 
has a square root; after Gauss this was disbelieved. But something was 
preserved, namely, the thought that we would now express by uttering (R) 
when only the real number system is relevant.16 
At the time that Quine was first challenging the view that there is a class 
of analytic truths, behaviourism was predominant in philosophical as well 
as psychological views of the mental. On certain behaviourist views of 
thought and belief, such as that there is no more to having a belief than a 
disposition to assent to a sentence of a public language, the Quinean view 
is incompatible with the possibility ofbelief preservation coupled with the- 
ory change. Given that behaviourist view, you simply could not lose your 
readiness to assent to a sentence while maintaining the belief it was used 
to express. However, the behaviourist view of thought and belief is an 
assumption increasingly at odds with the findings of cognitive psychology 
and has no independent justification. To the extent that Quine is committed 
to behaviourism, the views just presented are inconsistent with Quine's. 
But Quine's enduring observations about language can be uncoupled from 
behaviourist assumptions; thus liberated, Quine's position can accornmo- 
l 6  This example was prompted by another, suggested by David Auerbach: the 
thought expressed by the Attic Greek for '2 has no square root' before discovery 
of irrational numbers. 
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date the examples of preserved belief in the midst of theory change. What 
the liberated position maintains is that any belief may be rationally rejected 
in the light of future findings; what it has to accommodate is that some 
beliefs may be rationally retained even when their customary linguistic 
expressions become unacceptable. These are not inconsistent. 
The examples of theory change used here, those due to the discovery of 
non-Euclidean spaces and the complex number system, suggest another 
elaboration of the Quinean view. In the original picture, adjustments in the 
interior of the fabric of established beliefs are occasioned by conflicts 
with experience at the periphery. But conflicts with experience are not the 
only generators of rational change. The mathematical examples show that 
changes can be forced by the acquisition of new concepts not prompted 
by the need to accommodate recalcitrant data. The discovery of non- 
Euclidean spaces antedated formulation of the General Theory of Relativ- 
ity. The motive force for this discovery, as for the discovery of the com- 
plex numbers, was zeal for purely mathematical exploration, without 
thought for empirical applications." Hence there are empirical and a pri- 
ori factors operating independently, perceptual experience at the periph- 
ery and conceptual discoveries in the interior. 
7.Conclusion 
Quine argued that the doctrines of analyticity and verificationism were 
dogmas of empiricism, that is, doctrines unsupported by the available evi- 
dence. In the light of the above considerations, unmixed empiricism itself 
looks to be a dogma. In particular, the lack of evidence for a realm of ana- 
lytic knowledge does not establish empiricism, since there may be a non- 
empirical mode of knowledge, conceptual knowledge, which is also non- 
analytic. ' 
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l 7  See Gray (1979) and Crossley (1980) for details. 
I would Like to thank Michael Resnik and David Auerbach for stimulating 
discussions and Michael Resnik for helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. I would also like to thank W.D. (Bill) Hart for many discussions on these 
topics when we were colleagues. 
Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge 267 
REFERENCES 
Boysen, S. and Berntson, G. 1989: "Numerical Competence in a Chim- 
panzee (Pan Troglodytes)". Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
103, pp. 23-31. 
Capaldi, E. and Miller, D. 1989: "Counting in Rats: Its Functional Signif- 
icance and the Independent Cognitive Processes Which Comprise It". 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behaviour Processes, 
14, pp. 3-1 7. 
Church, R. and Meck, W. 1984: "The Numerical Attribute of Stimuli", in 
H. Roitblatt, T. Bever, and H. Terrace (eds.) Animal Cognition. Hills-
dale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Crossley, J. 1980: The Emergence of Number. Victoria, Australia: Upside 
Down Book Co. 
Giaquinto, M. 1995: "Concepts and Calculation". Mathematical Cogni- 
tion, pp. 6 1-8 1. 
Gray, J. 1979: Ideas of Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leslie, A. 1988: "The Necessity of Illusion: Perception and Thought in 
Infancy", in Weiskrantz, (ed.) Thought Without Language. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Peacocke, C. 1992: A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
-1993: "How Are A Priori Truths Possible?". European Journal of 
Philosophy 1, pp. 175-99. 
Putnam, H. 1962: "The Analytic and the Synthetic", reprinted in H. 
Putnam Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 
2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Originally pub- 
lished in Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, 111. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
-1976: 	 "'Two Dogmas' Revisited", reprinted in H. Putnam Realism 
and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3. Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1983. Originally published in Ryle, G. (ed.) 
Contemporavy Aspects of Philosophy. Oxford: Oriel Press, 1976. 
979: "Analyticity.and A Priority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine", 
reprinted in H. Putnam Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, 
Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Originally 
published in French, P. (ed.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Quine, W. 195 1 : "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", reprinted in W. Quine 
From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press 1980. Originally published in Philosophical Review, January 
1951. 
-1 
-1 
268 M. Giaquinto 
960: "Carnap and Logical Truth", reprinted in W. Quine The Ways 
of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1976. Originally published in Synthese 12, 1960. 
Rossor, M., Warrington, E., Cipolotti, L. 1995: "The Isolation of Calcu- 
lation Skills". Journal ofNeurology, 242, pp. 78-43 1: 
Spelke, E. 1988: "The Origins of Physical Knowledge", in L. Weiskrantz, 
(ed.) Thought Without Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wynn, K. 1992: "Addition and Subtraction in Human Infants". Nature 
358, pp. 749-50. 
